Compliance agent · AI risk governance
AI Vendor Risk Assessment Agent
An autonomous compliance agent, built with Rovo Architect, that investigates a third-party AI vendor across internal tickets, policies, DPAs, and web sources, then produces an evidence-backed risk score and a publish-ready Confluence assessment in minutes.
- My role
- Sole designer and AI architect
- When
- 2025 – present
- Tools
- Atlassian Rovo, Confluence API, Jira API, MX AI Risk Rubric, Web investigation
- Who it helps
- IT Security, Procurement, AI governance leads, and technical leaders evaluating third-party AI tools and vendor integrations.
- How it works
- Takes a four-item intake (vendor or tool, URL, MX use case, data sent), searches Confluence, Jira, vendor DPAs, security trust portals, and web sources on its own, scores across five weighted risk clusters, and formats a publish-ready Confluence page.
- My contribution
- Designed, prompted, and calibrated the agent using Rovo Architect. Implemented MX's five-cluster AI Risk Scoring Rubric, conservative-by-default scoring logic, and the Confluence publishing step behind a human gate.
- Why it’s valuable
- Cut vendor AI risk assessments from hours, or up to a week, of manual security and procurement review down to minutes, with every score attributed to a source and no undocumented assumptions.
Approach
- Built the agent with Rovo Architect so conservative-by-default evaluation rules and auditable evidence standards were enforced from the first draft.
- Designed a four-item intake (vendor or tool, product URL, the specific MX use case, and the data it will touch) that captures the context the agent cannot infer, without turning the user into a search engine.
- Set up research across internal Confluence and Jira spaces, vendor DPAs and whitepapers, SOC 2 and ISO certifications, model cards, and public web sources.
- Configured the five-cluster weighted scoring: Inherent System Risk, Performance and Reliability, Security and Compliance, Data Risk, and Operational Modifiers.
- Wrote strict evidence rules: mandatory citations, an 'Insufficient Evidence — Assumed High' default for gaps, and explicit human confirmation before any Confluence page is created.
- Demonstrated the agent to the Head of IT and validated its evidence gathering and rubric scoring against production vendor evaluations.
Outcomes
- Cut vendor risk assessment turnaround from hours, or up to a week, down to minutes.
- Demonstrated to the Head of IT and validated against production vendor evaluations.
- Every scored indicator carries a citation, so no unverified assumption reaches the vendor onboarding decision.
- Risk tiers (Low, Medium, High, Critical) map directly to required governance controls: monitoring, audit logs, and kill switches.
What I learned
- A compliance agent has to be conservative by default. When evidence is missing or ambiguous, assuming high risk protects the organization and makes the gap visible immediately.
- The agent has to act as an analyst, not a form. Finding public vendor DPAs, SOC 2 data, and sub-processor lists is the agent's job, not the user's.
- Showing the modifiers plainly (human oversight, how critical the decision is) helps teams see how their own implementation changes a vendor's net risk.
Overview
As teams adopt generative AI and specialized AI vendors, evaluating third-party AI risk becomes a bottleneck. Assessing a single vendor’s AI capabilities, training data handling, sub-processors, security certifications, and model governance used to take:
- Days of back-and-forth between procurement, security, and the requesting team.
- Manual searches across vendor trust centers, Data Processing Addenda (DPAs), SOC 2 reports, and internal Jira security review tickets.
- Risk scores that depended on who was doing the scoring.
Built with Rovo Architect, the AI Vendor Risk Assessment Agent works as a compliance analyst. Given the vendor name, product link, intended use case, and data exposure, it investigates internal and external sources, scores the tool against MX’s AI Risk Scoring Rubric, and formats a publish-ready Confluence evaluation in minutes.
Operating principles
- Research first, ask second. The user is not treated like a search engine. The agent asks only for internal context (the intended MX use case and data classification). Vendor documentation, DPAs, certifications, and model cards are investigated by the agent.
- Conservative by default. If evidence is ambiguous, the agent assigns the higher-risk score. If evidence cannot be found after exhausting internal and external channels, it assigns
Insufficient Evidence — Assumed Highso the gap is visible. - Every score cites a source. Each scored indicator names a specific document, URL, Jira ticket, or Confluence page, with a one-sentence justification.
- Present findings, don’t make the procurement decision. The agent calculates risk scores, identifies the tier, and lists the controls policy requires. Humans keep final approval.
- Human gate before publishing. The agent shows a complete in-chat preview and publishes to Confluence only on explicit confirmation.
The five-cluster risk scoring framework
The agent evaluates third-party AI tools across five weighted clusters and produces a composite score mapped to required operational controls:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ AI VENDOR RISK SCORING ENGINE │
├──────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┤
│ 1. Inherent System Risk │ Interpretability, Generative │
│ (Range: 3 – 21) │ Capacity, Agentic Autonomy │
├──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┤
│ 2. Performance & Reliability │ Benchmarks, Bias, Fairness, │
│ (Range: 1 – 13) │ Robustness, Explainability │
├──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┤
│ 3. Security & Compliance │ Surface, Posture, 4th Party, │
│ (Range: 1 – 11) │ Adversarial Risk, Certs │
├──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┤
│ 4. Data Risk │ Training on MX Data, Memory, │
│ (Range: 0 – 16) │ Filtering, PII Classification│
├──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┤
│ 5. Operational Modifiers │ Human Oversight Level, │
│ (Range: -7 to +5) │ Decision-Critical Use Impact │
└──────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────┘
│ Sum
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ GOVERNED RISK TIERS │
│ • Low (-2 to 20): Internal docs & basic model card │
│ • Medium (21 to 45): Human-in-the-loop review in SOP/tool │
│ • High (46 to 55): Periodic audit & escalation pathways │
│ • Critical (56 to 66): Exec review, red-teaming, kill-switch│
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Risk indicators
| Cluster | Indicator | Evaluated risk states |
|---|---|---|
| Inherent System Risk | Interpretability Level | Transparent (1) · Partially Interpretable (4) · Opaque/Black Box (7) |
| Generative Capacity | None (1) · Template-Based (4) · Context-Limited (4) · Open-Ended (7) | |
| Agentic Profile | None (1) · Limited Autonomy (4) · Fully Autonomous (7) | |
| Performance & Reliability | Performance Metrics | High (0) · Medium (1) · Low (2) · Not Available (3) |
| Bias Assessment | Complete (1) · Partial (2) · None (3) | |
| Robustness & Fairness | Formally Tested (0) · None (2) | |
| Explainability Method | SHAP/LIME/Other (0) · None (2) | |
| Security & Compliance | Access Surface | Internal (1) · External API (2) · Public (3) |
| Security Posture | Hardened (0) · Baseline (1) · Unverified (2) | |
| 4th Party AI Risk | None (0) · Moderate (1) · High (2) | |
| Certifications | NIST / ISO 27001 / SOC 2 (0) · Other (1) · None (2) | |
| Data Risk | MX Data in LLM Training | Retained for Model Training (2) · Zero Data Retention (0) |
| Input/Output Filtering | Active Guardrails (0) · None / Unverified (2) | |
| Data Classification | Public (-3) · Internal/NPI (0) · PII/Financial (3) | |
| Persistent Memory | Session Only (0) · Cross-Session Retention (2) | |
| Operational Modifiers | Human Oversight Level | Strict Human-in-the-Loop (-7) · Partial (-4) · None (0) |
| Decision Criticality | Low Workflow Impact (0) · Influences Decisions (+3) · Critical (+5) |
Investigation and publishing workflow
[Phase 1: Minimal Intake]
│ • Vendor/Tool Name & URL
│ • MX Specific Use Case
│ • Data Classification & Touchpoints
▼
[Phase 2: Multi-Channel Autonomous Research]
│ • Internal: Confluence spaces, Jira security & procurement tickets
│ • Vendor: DPAs, Trust Portals, Sub-processor lists, Model Cards
│ • Independent: SOC 2, ISO certifications, CVE / breach history
▼
[Phase 3: Conservative-by-Default Rubric Scoring]
│ • Map evidence to indicators with mandatory citations
│ • Auto-assign 'Insufficient Evidence — Assumed High' on gaps
│ • Calculate composite score and map to Risk Tier & Controls
▼
[Phase 4: Human Gate & Confluence Page Publishing]
│ • Present complete formatted draft in chat
│ • Await explicit human confirmation & target space/parent
│ • Publish structured Markdown page via Confluence API
Architecture and safety controls
The agent is built so a reviewer gets a rigorous assessment without auditing every underlying document by hand.
1. Minimal intake, autonomous depth
Human input is limited to internal context that cannot be inferred from outside:
- Product target: vendor name, tool name, and the specific product URL.
- Workflow context: the MX team, workflow, and operational touchpoint.
- Data exposure: integration type (API, browser extension, SSO, native client), the data fields passed, and their classification (Public, Internal/NPI, PII, Financial).
Everything after that, including retrieving DPAs, SOC 2 compliance, sub-processor disclosures, and training data policies, is done by the agent across internal spaces and external trust centers.
2. Conservative scoring and evidence attribution
To protect against model hallucination and vendor marketing claims:
- Mandatory sourcing: every indicator score requires an auditable citation and a one-sentence factual justification.
- Conservative ambiguity resolution: if documentation is unclear or conflicting, the agent defaults to the higher-risk score.
- Explicit gap flagging: if evidence cannot be found after exhausting all channels, the indicator is marked
Insufficient Evidence — Assumed High, so data gaps show on the final scorecard.
3. Evaluation is separate from procurement
The agent is an analyst, not a decision-maker. It calculates composite scores, maps them to required governance controls (executive review, kill-switch readiness, mandatory human verification), and generates the Confluence report. The procurement decision stays with people.